The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report - Kostenloses Hörbuch

Autor(en): Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,

Sprache: English

Genre(s): Wirtschaft & Ökonomie Sachbücher

1 / 183Preface

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183 Kapitel

1. Preface
2. Conclusions of the Commission
3. Conclusions of the Commission, concluded
4. Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1
5. Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2
6. Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3
7. Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos
8. Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis
9. Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
10. Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance
11. Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives
12. Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities
13. Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management
14. Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash
15. Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance
16. Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth
17. Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization
18. Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending
19. Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil
20. Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators
21. Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force
22. Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium
23. Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny
24. Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending
25. Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position
26. Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention"
27. Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"
28. Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6
29. Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity
30. Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan
31. Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit
32. Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product
33. Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check
34. Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace
35. Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7
36. Ch. 8. The CDO Machine
37. Ch. 8. We Created the Investor
38. Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function
39. Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest
40. Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street
41. Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime
42. Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy
43. Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess
44. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8
45. Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"
46. Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments
47. Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory
48. Regulators: markets will always self-correct
49. Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance
50. Lehman: From Moving to Storage
51. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices
52. 2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool
53. Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals
54. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9
55. Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"
56. Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"
57. Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"
58. AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"
59. Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"
60. Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"
61. Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"
62. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10
63. Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"
64. Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"
65. Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"
66. Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"
67. Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"
68. Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11
69. Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries
70. Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive
71. Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds
72. Rating Agencies
73. AIG: Well Bigger
74. Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12
75. Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro
76. Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"
77. Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"
78. Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"
79. Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"
80. Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"
81. Commission conclusions on Chapter 13
82. Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)
83. Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"
84. Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"
85. Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"
86. Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"
87. Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"
88. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14
89. Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)
90. Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"
91. Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"
92. Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"
93. Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"
94. Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"
95. Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"
96. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15
97. Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)
98. Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"
99. Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"
100. Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"
101. Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"
102. Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"
103. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16
104. Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)
105. Ch 17 "A good time to buy"
106. Ch 17 "The only game in town"
107. Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"
108. Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"
109. Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"
110. Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"
111. Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"
112. Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"
113. Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"
114. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17
115. Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)
116. Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"
117. Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"
118. Ch 18 "Spook the market"
119. Ch 18 "Imagination hat"
120. Ch 18 "Heads of family"
121. Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"
122. Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"
123. Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"
124. Ch 18 "A calamity"
125. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18
126. Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)
127. Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"
128. Ch 19 "Spillover effect"
129. Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"
130. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19
131. Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)
132. Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"
133. Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"
134. Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"
135. Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"
136. Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"
137. Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"
138. Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"
139. Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"
140. Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"
141. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20
142. Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)
143. Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"
144. Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"
145. Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"
146. Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"
147. Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"
148. Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"
149. Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"
150. Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"
151. Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"
152. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22
153. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro
154. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others?
155. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis
156. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis
157. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy
158. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble
159. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets
160. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed
161. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure
162. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic
163. Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing
164. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro
165. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary
166. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages
167. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects
168. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages
169. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS
170. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis?
171. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion
172. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro
173. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system
174. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin
175. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro
176. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role
177. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards
178. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1
179. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2
180. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages
181. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing
182. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act
183. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion

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Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report - Kostenloses Hörbuch

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